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Abstract 
The medium of (oral) language is mostly disregarded (or overlooked) in contemporary media the-
ories. This 'ignoring of language' in media studies is often accompanied by an inadequate transport 
model of communication, and it converges with an 'ignoring of mediality' in mentalistic theories of 
language. In the present article it will  be  argued that this misleading opposition of language and 
media can only be  overcome if one already regards oral language, not just written language, as  a 
medium of the human mind. In my argumentation I fall  back on Wittgenstein's conception of lan-
guage games  to try to show how Wittgenstein's ideas can help  us  to clear up the problem of the 
mediality of language and also to show to what extent the mentalistic conception of Chomskyan 
provenance cannot be adequate to the phenomenon of language. 
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1. Introduction 
Not least through the development and the distribution of the so-called New Media, the 
topic of mediality has become a vital issue in cultural studies and humanities. In the con-
text of current discourses  concerning the concept of medium one can observe that the 
expression 'medium' is  often used to refer equally to such different objects of reference 
as  the internet, television, print-media, the computer, writing, script, pictures, waves of 
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sound, etc. - often without any regard to the categorial differences between them. One can 
also observe that the medium of oral language is  mostly disregarded (or overlooked) in 
this context. What are the reasons for this phenomenon? 
One plausible answer to this question has been formulated by the German linguist Lud-
wig Jager in his paper Die Sprachvergessenheit der Medientheorie:
l  many theories of media 
are still based on a transport model, a sender-receiver model of communication. One is 
oriented towards the paradigm of technical media and expands  this  one-sided concept 
of media to the area of non-technical communication. This way one comes to a general 
concept of communication media that ignores the medial aspect of oral language and 
regards it as the function of media to transfer 'pre-medial thoughts' from one person to 
another (Jager, 2000,  p.  15).2 This ignoring of the mediality of language finally leads to 
an improper conceptual opposition of language and media. 
The point of Jager's argumentation is that he connects this Sprachvergessenheit within 
media discourse to a Medialitiitsvergessenheit
3 of those language theories that are oriented 
towards the linguistic mentalism of Chomskyan provenance. In a word, the thesis is:  the 
ignoring of language in media theories converges with an ignoring of mediality in mental-
istic theories of language. Through the fixation on the mental, the 'materiality,4 of lan-
guage  signs  gets  completely  out  of focus:  writing  and  other  media  appear  as  mere 
means  of transport,  transferring  'media-neutral'  thoughts from  a  sender  to  a  receiver 
(Jager, 2000, pp. 26-28). This thesis is  developed in Jager's paper; furthermore, he shows 
that the misleading, artificial opposition of language and media can only be overcome if 
one already regards oral language, not only written language, as an essential medium of 
the human mind. Of course, we can only succeed in doing this if we  try to develop - as 
an alternative to the transport model - a concept of media which takes into account the 
specific mediality, that is,  the specific medial qualities, of the medium of language. 
The present article takes up these ideas; here I fall back on Wittgenstein's conception of 
language games to try to show how Wittgenstein's ideas about the knowledge-constitutive 
status of 'everyday language' can help us to clear up the problem of the mediality of lan-
guage and also to show to what extent the mentalistic conception cannot be adequate to 
the phenomenon of language. Then, at the very end of the article I refer to a field  work 
project of the Belgian sociolinguist Jan Blommaert whose analyses uncover and illustrate 
the  (negative)  practical  implications  of Chomsky's  theory  of competence.  It will  be 
explained in what way Blommaert's empirical results are in agreement with my concept 
I  The expression 'Sprachvergessenheit der Medientheorie' is difficult to translate into English. It refers to the 
forgetting and ignoring of language in many theories of media. 
2  As  an extreme example of such  a concept of media see  K.  Boeckmanns theory of communication media, 
where it is  written: 'Ein Kommunikationsmedium ist alles, was den Bezug zwischen den Gedanken des Senders 
und  den  Gedanken  des  Empfangers  ermoglicht'  (Boeckmann,  1994,  p.  34).  In  a  very  interesting work  the 
primatologist King has clarified that the orientation towards the transport model or the 'conduit metaphor' has 
also  been  playing a central (and confusing)  role  in  the research on the communication of apes (King, 2004, 
especially Chapter 2).  On the implications of the 'conduit metaphor' see  also Reddy, 1993. 
3  In  analogy  to  'Sprachvergessenheit'  the  expression  'Medialitatsvergessenheit'  refers  to  the  ignoring  of 
mediality. 
4  The term  'materiality' is  meant here  to  bring into prominence the  fact  that there  is  nothing like  a  pure, 
'pre-medial' thought. Every thought, every idea, every message needs something like a physical substratum, in 
which it can manifest itself: sound, ink on paper, pigments on a canvas, etc. - On the idea of the 'materiality' of 
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of mediality and the critique of mentalism. But first it is necessary to give a heuristic def-
inition of 'medium'. 
2.  On the term 'medium' 
To find such a definition it is useful first to separate the term 'medium' from terms like 
'tool' and 'instrument'. A tool is something we use for a certain purpose; and - as Sybille 
Kramer has pointed out - it 'remains external' to the object it deals with.  To a certain 
extent it can be 'removed' from the object. A message on the other hand is  always given 
in a medium it cannot be separated from. What is mediated cannot exist outside the med-
ium (Kramer, 1998a,b, p. 83). 
Kramer's distinction between medium and instrument or tool touches on a crucial point 
by focussing on the externality of a tool compared with a medium. But in another sense it 
is a bit misleading in my opinion, because the terms 'instrument' and 'tool' emphasize the 
object's substance- or thing-like character (Dinglichkeit).  Because of this I prefer the dis-
tinction between medium and means. In a philosophical sense a means is not a thing but a 
process, an action for a certain purpose (see Stetter, 2002, p. 4). It  is not the hammer that is 
the means but the action of hitting the nail into the wall. Viewed phenomenologically, the 
relation between means and end can be characterized as a temporal sequence: after I have 
hit the nail into the wall I can hang up the picture; after I have cooked I can eat (Stetter, 
2002,  p.  4).  Viewed logically,  the means is  a sufficient but not a necessary condition of 
attaining the purpose: I could also bore a hole and turn a hook into the wall; I could also 
go to a restaurant and order something to eat. 
In the case of the medium it is totally different. Here, we have a 'simultaneity of means 
and purpose', and so  the distinction between means and purpose actually loses its sense 
here. The particular performance is  intrinsically bound to a certain medium, which gives 
it its specific form and from which it cannot be separated, because then it would be just 
another performance. For instance I can only dance by the medium of body movement, 
I can only speak by the medium of language.
5 Here, I can follow Kramer again: 
An ein Medium [  ...  ] ist man gebunden, in ihm bewegt man sich; und was in einem 
Medium vorliegt, kann [  ...  J nicht [  ...  J ganzlich ohne Medium gegeben sein.  So gibt 
es keine Sprache jenseits der Rede, der Schrift oder der gestischen Artikulation. AIle 
Theorien, welche Medien als auBerliche Vehikel und Trager ihrer Botschaften begrei-
fen, verfehlen gerade diese ihre nicht-instrumentelle Dimension: Sie behandeln Med-
ien so,  als ob sie Instrumente seien (Kramer, 1998a,b, pp. 83-84).6 
Thus, in the preliminary definition that I wish to propose we  have two main qualities 
which characterize media: 
5  Here, I am not only talking about oral language but also about sign language. Using sign language is  also a 
kind of speaking. 
6  Translation:  'One is  bound to a medium,  one moves  in  it,  and what is  present in  a medium cannot exist 
without any medium. Thus there is no language behind speech, writing and gestic articulation. All theories that 
conceptualize media as  external vehicles and carriers of their messages miss  this non-instrumental dimension: 
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(1)  In contrast to a means a medium is  characterized by a 'simultaneity of means and 
purpose'. 
(2)  In contrast to an instrument, a medium (and also a means) is not a thing or a sub-
stance but a phenomenon of performance. 
What does this mean more precisely? - Of course, it does not mean that media have 
nothing to do  with 'substances' or with materiality. At the outset of this  article it has 
already been mentioned that it is one of the main characteristics of  media that they always 
have £i  material 'component': every thought, every idea, every message needs something 
like a physical substratum, in which it can manifest itself: ink on paper, pigments on a can-
vas, waves of sound, etc. But mediality is more than materiality: the medium is neither ink 
nor le'tters, but rather writing; not pigments but painting, not sound but oral language. 
This is what I mean by saying that a medium is a phenomenon of performance. One could 
also say: a medium is  a symbolic
7 process in some sort of material 'substratum'. 
Of course, conceptions and definitions like this always depend on certain purposes, and 
the present article has arisen from a linguistic context; accordingly, the concept of media is 
oriented towards the idea of language being a medium. At the beginning I have already 
explained why I think that - in linguistics and media theory - it is  adequate to  regard 
language as  a medium.  In the following I will fall  back on Wittgenstein's conception of 
language games to make the specifics of linguistic mediality clearer. 
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein and the constitutive status of 'everyday language' 
It is really not a coincidence that Wittgenstein comes into play here, for he is not only 
one of the most influential philosophers of language of the last century, he is  also one of 
the most prominent opponents of the transport model. In the Philosophical Investigations 
(in the following:  PI) Wittgenstein (2001)  shows that certain misleading concepts of lan-
guage can only be overcome if  we 'make a radical break with the idea that language always 
functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts' (Wittgenstein, 
2001, PI 304, p. 87). In Wittgenstein's opinion this mentalistic picture of language is based 
on the traditional theory of representation, which regards language as a mere means for 
representing the world which is separated from it and onto  logically pre-existent. Following 
this theory the only purpose of the use of words is to function as external signs, as 'labels' 
CNamensUifelchen,)8 of objects which exist independently from language.  Accordingly, 
sentences  appear as  'combinations of such names'  (Wittgenstein,  2001,  PI  1,  p.  2).  As 
an alternative to this  traditional model Wittgenstein develops his conception of diverse 
social language games, all of them following different rules and purposes. 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? -
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 
'words', sentences. And this mUltiplicity is  not something fixed,  given once for all; 
but new types oflanguage, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, 
and others become obsolete and get forgotten [  ...  ] 
7  The term 'symbolic' is used here in a very broad, quite un  terminological sense. For example, I do not make a 
terminological distinction between symbols and signs in  this article. 
8  Vgl.  Wittgenstein (2001, PI  15, p.  6). J.G.  Schneider / Language & Communication 26 (2006)  331-342  335 
Here the term 'language-game' is  meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is  part of an activity,  or of a  life-form (Wittgenstein,  2001, 
PI 23, p.  10). 
In my  opinion this  game metaphor is  still very striking and suggestive.  As  in many 
games,  verbal  and non-verbal activities  are very closely  interwoven in  language games 
(for instance:  I go  to the baker, I ask for a loaf of rye bread, he  gives  it to me,  I pay 
for it, and so on).  In language games  we  act and orient ourselves towards multiple and 
diverse objects.  Language and world are not seen as  being separated from each other in 
this conception. From this conception it also follows that language games are in principle 
open and diverse:  there is  no access  to the world totally independent of language, and 
therefore there is  not one function  of language, which is  to represent an ontologically 
pre-structured  reality.  The traditional  conception of language  as  a  'mirror of nature' 
(see Rorty, 1980)  is misleading at decisive points. 
The logical reasons for this are given by Wittgenstein in his argumentations concerning 
rules and private language.
9 There the analogy between speaking and playing is  also very 
relevant. Someone who takes part in language games is  also following certain rules, but 
without - this is a big contrast to a calculus - having to think about these rules when follow-
ing them; in many cases even without having to know them explicitly (Wittgenstein, 1965, 
Blue Book, p. 25). In addition, a language game leaves room for our phantasy - in contrast 
to a calculus it is not totally determined by rules, but only as far as required by the particular 
purpose.
10  In his discussion of the concept of rule Wittgenstein's position is consistently 
pragmatic: the misleading 'metaphysical' question 'How can a rule determine an action?' 
is substituted by the question 'What does it mean to follow a rule?'. By this change of per-
spective Wittgenstein emphasizes that following a rule is a social practice. It  is not possible 
to follow a rule privately, because then there would be no criteria to distinguish between 'fol-
lowing the rule' and 'thinking that one was following the rule'  .11 In other words: there would 
be no criterion independent of  the speaker's perspective that could help us to decide whether 
one has followed the rule correctly or not. Here, Wittgenstein is talking about the normative 
aspect, the aspect of acceptance and correction by others. 12 
In the context of the so-called private language argumentation Wittgenstein illustrates 
this fundamental fact by sketching the following scenario: 
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a 
certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in 
a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. - I first want to remark that 
a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. - But still I can give myself a kind of 
ostensive definition. - How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. 
But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention 
on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. - But what is this ceremony 
for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of 
9  On the following see  also Schneider, 2002, Chapter 2.4. 
10  See for instance Wittgenstein (2001, PI 83- 85, pp.  33-34). 
11  See Wittgenstein (2001, PI 202).  Anscombe's English translation of 'der Regel folgen' is  'obeying a rule'.  I 
prefer the term 'following a rule', because Wittgenstein does not say: 'die Regel befolgen'. In contrast to 'die Regel 
befolgen' the expression 'der Regel  folgen' does not entail that this is  a conscious process. 
12  On the normative aspect of rule-following see also Ui.hteenmaki, 2003. 336  1. G.  Schneider / Language & Communication 26 (2006)  331-342 
a sign. - Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this 
way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. - But 'I 
impress it on myself can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the 
connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no  criterion of  correct-
ness. One would like to say:  whatever is going to  seem right to  me is right.  And that 
only means that here we can't talk about 'right' (Wittgenstein, 2001, PI 258, p.  78, my 
italics). 
One reason why this scenario is  so  fascinating is  that here Wittgenstein is  abstracting 
from  almost everything that characterizes language.  The thought experiment is  guided 
by  the following question: what would someone have to do to fix a  'meaning' by using 
a private ostensive definition - 'private' in the sense that this 'definition' should be com-
pletely independent of any language community. By this 'ceremony' a sign should be con-
stituted, which, by definition, can only be understood by the speaker himself.13 Of course, 
ostensive definitions are also  part of our language.  For example,  we  often learn words 
referring to colours through such definitions: 14 in such cases, somebody points to an object 
and refers to it with the corresponding word. But these ostensive definitions are not private 
but pUblic. They could always be misunderstood, and so there must be a social context in 
which it is possible to clear up such misunderstandings. Then we always have the possibil-
ity of new misunderstandings, which again have to be cleared up and so on. If the learner 
wants to have the possibility of dispelling such misunderstandings at all, he has to know 
roughly, which overall role the particular word plays in language (Wittgenstein, 2001, PI 
30, p. 12). This certainly does not mean that the learner must be able to formulate or expli-
cate the rules; he must only have the practical competence to take part in the social lan-
guage  game.  This  competence  can  only  be  trained and developed  if there  is  a  social 
context in which the learner has the opportunity to be corrected by others. 
In  Wittgenstein's thought experiment things  are very different:  the supposed private 
ostensive  definition should be  entirely independent of a  publicly  'sanctioned' language 
use.  And so  it is  not possible for others to check if the 'speaker' of the private language 
uses  his  signs  right.  But - and this  is  the  surprising twist  of the diary  scenario - the 
'speaker' himselfis also not able to do so. He cannot 'establish the meaning,15 of any sign, 
because there is no criterion independent of the speaker's perspective. By writing the sign 
no meaning is constituted at all; the written'S' is only a symptom or an indication that the 
author of the diary  thought  to  have  the certain sensation.  How should he know when 
repeating the writing of'S' if he is referring always to the same or to something different 
when using this sign? On the one hand: if he wants to know what the sign means he has to 
elicit the right memory of the sensation meant. On the other hand: to be able to elicit the 
right  memory  he  must already  know  what the  sign  means.
16  This  circle  is  absolutely 
unavoidable in the case of the private ostensive definition. 
If  we want to create, for example, a new name for a special kind of pain, this could only 
be possible because we  have already been trained in our public language as  to what the 
word 'pain' means or how the word 'pain' is  used in our language: 
J3  See also Wittgenstein (2001, PI 243, p. 75). 
14  See also Wittgenstein (2001, PI 30,  p.  13). 
15  See quotation above. 
16  This crucial point was formulated first by Anthony Kenny, see Kenny, 1974, p.  27. 1. G.  Schneider / Language &  Communication 26 (2006) 331-342  337 
But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'? [  ...  ] When one says 'He 
gave a name to his sensation' one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the lan-
guage is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak 
of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the 
grammar of the word 'pain'; it shews the post where the new word is stationed (Witt-
genstein, 2001, PI 257, p.  78). 
Already  at the  beginning  of the  PI Wittgenstein had used  a  similar  argumentation 
against the concept of language and language acquisition presented by Augustine, who 
believes the only function of language is to name things. Here, Wittgenstein shows by cre-
ating several language games
17 that syntactic and formal-semantic categories (for instance: 
'names') can only develop in difference to each other and that consequently none of these 
could be seen as the basic or essential category of all the others:  18  so naming loses its tra-
ditional special status; it is  an important but not the  basic language game. It cannot be 
constitutive of speaking in general for one must already 'have' language 'in order to be 
capable of asking a thing's name'.19 As we see here, naming is not suitable to form a con-
nection between language and a language-independent world, for such a world is  nothing 
but a fiction.  The reason why we understand sentences is not that they refer to ontologi-
cally given objects. We understand them because we are able to use them in difference to 
other sentences of our language, and this is  only possible, because, as  Wittgenstein says, 
'our  language  contains the possibility of those other sentences'  (see  Wittgenstein, 2001, 
PI 20,  p.  8).  Every explanation takes place in  a developed language,  and therefore ulti-
mately we  are neither able to explain language nor language acquisition in its  entirety. 
In this sense everyday language, 'normal' language, is constitutive. We cannot get 'behind' 
it, we cannot compare language and world from a language-independent point of view: 
When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of 
every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to 
say?  Then how is another one to  be constructed? [  ...  ] 
In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of 
preparatory, provisional one);  this  by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior 
facts about language (Wittgenstein, 2001, PI 120, p. 42).20 
4.  Conclusion - mediality, 'orality', 'literacy' 
Now we can come back to the transport model, already discussed at the outset of this 
paper. If Wittgenstein's arguments on the topic of private language have shown one thing, 
it is this: independently of social actions we have no possibility of referring to objects, not 
17  See Wittgenstein (2001, PI 2 and 8). 
18  See  Schneider, 2002, pp.  31-45; Stetter, 1997, p.  563, pp. 546-555. On the similarities between Wittgenstein 
and Saussure concerning the idea of 'difference' see also Harris, 1988, pp. 42-45. 
19  Wittgenstein (2001, PI 30, p. 13), my  italics; see also Wittgenstein (2001,  PI 31). 
20  'I can adduce only exterior facts about language' can be paraphrased here as  'J can only describe the use of 
everyday language (because there is  no deeper essence behind it)'; see also for example, Wittgenstein (2001, PI 
116,  p.  41).  Here,  Wittgenstein is  arguing against his  own  early philosophy in  saying that, at the end, every 
formalized 'ideal language' can only be derived from the contingent grammar of a particular natural language. So 
everyday language becomes the basis of Wittgenstein's philosophizing. 338  J. G. Schneider  / Language &  Communication 26 (2006) 331-342 
even to mental objects - these objects would 'cancel out' like the famous beetle in the box 
(see  Wittgenstein,  2001,  PI 293,  p.  85).  Language is  not a mere means of transferring 
thoughts from one person to another, but is rather a medium: only in language can thoughts 
take shape - always dependent on the particular medial manifestations. A thought needs a 
'body', something 'material' in which it can manifest itself.21  This  fundamental media-
theoretical fact,  which every linguist has to take into account, has been understood by 
no philosopher better than by Wittgenstein: in an often-quoted section of the Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein answers the question 'How am I to know what he means when I 
see nothing but the signs he gives?' with the counter-question 'How is he to know what he 
means, when he has nothing but the signs either' (Wittgenstein (2001, PI 504,  p.  118)). 
Understanding is  shown only by the way one uses words in 'language games'. Or, to put 
it more generally: as communicating beings we are always moving in different sign systems. 
There is no meaning and no understanding independent of symbolizing22 and media. 
The private language argument provides the logical basis of  this conception of language 
and media. As linguistic beings we are categorially social beings. Thus, supporting Jager's 
argumentation discussed at the beginning of this paper, oral language is  entirely rehabil-
itated as  a knowledge-constitutive medium of the human mind.  Only if we  reflect on its 
medial status do we have a chance to come to an adequate concept of media and mediality 
at all. In saying this, I do not of  course wish to revive the Rousseauesque picture of a pure, 
undefiled orality. Surely it is  not possible for a human being, who has grown up in a lit-
erate culture, to draw a sharp line between 'orality' and 'literacy'. As above all Derrida has 
shown us, the development of  writing and script is not only a condition of the possibility of 
distinguishing between 'orality' and 'literacy', but in certain respects also a condition of its 
impossibility:23 our oral language and also our view of our oral language are entirely influ-
enced by and permeated with written language.24 This phenomenon starts with our view of 
grammatically correct sentences,  which is  - often unconsciously - oriented towards the 
model of written language, and goes on, for example, to the situation of giving a lecture: 
one has prepared the text in writing, one quotes from books, one has got into the habit of 
using  a  language  which  is  fairly  literate,  which  is  strongly  influenced  by  writing  and 
script.25 Where is the borderline here between 'orality' and 'literacy'? Interestingly enough, 
21  This thought has already been formulated very clearly by Humboldt (1999): 'Language is the formative organ 
of thought.  Intellectual  activity,  entirely  mental,  entirely internal,  and to  some  extent passing without trace, 
becomes, through sound, externalized in speech and perceptible to the senses. Thought and language are therefore 
one and inseparable from each other. But the former is also intrinsically bound to the necessity of  entering into a 
union with the verbal sound; thought cannot otherwise achieve clarity, nor the representation become a concept 
(On language Section 9, p.  54).  See also Volosinov (1973,  Chapter 3), where Voloshinov argues that all  signs, 
including mental signs, must have material embodiment: thoughts are manifested in inner speech which is social 
in  its nature. On  the idea of the 'materiality' of communication see also Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer (Eds.),  1988. 
22  See footnote 7. 
23  See Derrida, 1967  , see also Kramer, 2002,  p.  114. 
24  See  e.g.  Harris, 2000,  especially  Chapter 8;  Olson,  1993;  Stetter,  1997;  Gunther,  1995. - On  the relation 
between  Japanese  writing  and  spoken  Japanese  (in  contrast  to  alphabetic  writing)  see  also  David  Lurie's 
contribution in  this volume; see also Lurie, 2001. 
25  One attempt to consider these 'interferences' in  the debate on 'orality' and 'literacy' has been established by 
Koch and Oesterreicher, who distinguish between 'conceptional' orality and literacy on the one hand and 'medial' 
orality  and  literacy  on  the  other  hand.  A  scientific  presentation  is  'conception  ally  literate',  although  it  is 
performed in  the  'phonic medium'; in  contrast to this  a private letter is  'conceptionally oral', although it is 
realized in  a 'graphic medium'. See Koch and Oesterreicher, 1994, p.  587. J.G. Schneider / Language &  Communication 26 (2006) 331-342  339 
Wittgenstein, who philosophizes mostly in the style of an oral dialogue and who refers 
mainly to  oral language,26  sometimes uses  examples  of written language:  one of these 
examples is  the diary scenario discussed above. 
Even if it is therefore not possible to draw a sharp line between 'orality' and 'literacy',27 
the fact of the mediality of oral language must be reflected in the current media discourse 
within cultural studies; we must ascribe medial status also to oral language and not only to 
writing and script. A reflection of this fact is not a sufficient but a necessary condition, if 
we want to overcome the transport model and to develop a conception that does justice to 
the particular medial manifestations of language.28 
Now we can come back to the preliminary definition of 'medium' offered at the begin-
ning of this paper. There are at least  two  important reasons why language should be 
regarded as a (paradigmatic) medium and why mediality should be linked to performance 
and symbolizing: 
(1)  Through subsuming of language under the category 'media' the material aspect of 
language (sound, ink on paper, etc.) is  brought into prominence. Thus, we  get the 
opportunity to compare language with other media and also to analyze the different 
medial manifestations of language (headword: 'orality and literacy'). 
(2)  By  linking the concept of media to performance and symbolizing,  the  'dynamic' 
aspect of media is  emphasized,  and it becomes obvious that mediality cannot be 
reduced to materiality. 
For instance, talking about the mediality of oral language and writing means talking 
about the categorial properties which define these media as  such.  When comparing the 
mediality of oral and written language we find a lot of significant differences. One of them 
is  that in written language we  can distinguish between 'text' and 'texture'  .29  The texture 
concerns the materiality (e.g., ink on white paper, pixels on a screen); it is fixed and per-
sistent. In contrast to the texture, the text is what we understand; it must be 'produced' all 
over again every time the texture is  read. In oral language we do not have an analog to 
such a fixed texture, and this is one point which shows that it has a different mediality. This 
different mediality has a fundamental impact on the use of media in social practice. The 
persistence of the texture makes it possible to produce sentence types very different in kind 
from those found in oral language, and often requiring specialized knowledge in order to 
be able to process them. While in an oral utterance performance and result of the perfor-
mance build a temporal unity (see Auer, 2000), the texture does not show how long it took 
the writer to produce it. He or she always has the possibility of revising it and to make it 
more complex (parentheses, hypotaxes,  etc.).  So  it is  indeed a  medial problem when a 
speaker reads  out a  written,  syntactically  complicated text and the  audience does  not 
26  See also Wittgenstein (2001, PI 23): 'Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking [my italics] of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form'. 
27  On the fundamental conceptional problems concerning the distinction between 'orality' and 'literacy' see also 
the contributions of Malcolm Hyman and David Lurie in this volume; see also Harris, 2000, pp. 229-237. 
28  To achieve  this the concept of media must be elaborated in the direction of a general  theory of different 
symbol systems. In my opinion a very fruitful basis of this has been formulated by Nelson Goodman in his book 
Languages of Art, where he distinguishes  between analog and digital  symbol schemata.  See Goodman,  1968, 
Chapter IV; see also Goodman and Elgin,  1988, Chapter VIII. 
29  On the distinction between 'text' and 'texture' see Stetter (1997, Chapter 7). 340  1. G.  Schneider / Language &  Communication 26 (2006) 331-342 
understand him. In cases like this, 'media competence' would especially consist in adapting 
the text for the particular medial situation and audience. 
In my  opinion this concept of mediality and of language being a medium, which has 
only been outlined in the present paper, can be fruitful not only for media theory but espe-
cially  for  post-Chomskyan  (and  post-structuralist)  linguistics.  Linguistic  theory  of 
Chomskyan provenance has led to an impasse, because it has concentrated only on the 
mental  aspect  and  thus  ignored  both the  different  medial  manifestations  of language 
and its performative aspect. 
Especially in sociolinguistic research we have various examples that clarify the negative 
practical implications of Chomskyan mentalism and his Medialitiitsvergessenheit. One very 
striking example is  presented and analyzed by Jan Blommaert in his  field  work project 
about Belgium  asylum  procedures  (Blommaert,  2001;  Blommaert and  Maryns,  2001). 
During these  procedures the  asylum seekers  are interviewed  about their home country 
to make sure that they really come from where they claim to. Apart from these interviews 
there are hardly any occasions in which the asylum seekers are asked to speak. The bulk of 
the 'communication' in the particular case consists of written texts by other persons: law-
yers, welfare workers, etc. Through this series of  written texts the 'original narrative' of the 
asylum seeker is 'remoulded', 'remodelled' and ere-narrated' time and time again, and so it 
becomes a 'text trajectory with various phases and instances of transformation' (Blomma-
ert, 2001, p.  438). The 'original narrative' is  the input for a long series of 'replications'; 
and, remarkably enough, it is  assumed that the difference between the narrative and its 
transcriptions can be neglected. As Blommaert points out, this whole story of transcrip-
tions and commentaries is treated by the officials as a 'singular text' and the responsibility 
for  the whole  text is  attributed to the asylum seeker himself.  He is  constructed as  the 
'responsible author for the whole intertextuality complex, despite the enormous differences 
in text-structure and text-modality, the genre and the code, the social spaces in which ver-
sions are being produced and used,  and the power and authority attributed to different 
versions of the text' (Blommaert, 2001, p. 438). 
One might argue that this is not mainly a linguistic issue but a political one. Although at 
one level this is obviously true, the procedure also shows the implications of the Chomsk-
yan paradigm: it is a perfect example of the ignoring ofmediality. When analyzing proce-
dures like this we 'enter' - as Blommaert puts it - 'worlds in which talk and written text are 
seen as replicas of one another' (Blommaert, 2001, p. 446). The whole procedure is implic-
itly guided by a vulgar version of Chomsky's mentalistic theory of competence;30 and to a 
certain extent it really can appeal to this theory: to the idea of a pure, fixed, monolingual 
competence which is autonomous and almost independent of social factors. What we need 
is a new definition of the relation between performance and competence on the basis of a 
precise description of linguistic performances - whether oral or written?l 
30  Of course, this does not mean that Chomsky would endorse such test methods;  probably he  would protest 
against the whole procedure. But mainly for political reasons. In my  opinion his  linguistic theory provides no 
argument against such methods and is  more or less in agreement with them. 
31  One step into this direction is  the anthology Gibt es eine Sprache hinter dem Sprechen? (ed. by Kramer and 
Konig (2002)),  where  the  topic  'performance  and competence'  is  discussed  from  various  philosophical  and 
linguistic perspectives.  See also the programmatic articles in  Harris and Wolf (Eds.), 1998. J.G.  Schneider / Language  &  Communication 26 (2006) 331-342  341 
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